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To McBride and Isaac's credit, wbile both take sides, each,
in bis own way, makes cautionary remarks against declaring a winner.
McBride reveals that as his philosophical sensibilities have evolved
he has come to have more sympathy for the spirit, if not the letter,
of Camus. In words well-worth heeding, McBride explains, "it is
increasingly difficult for me to imagine, despite Marxian and Sartrean
optimism, a conjunction of philosophical theory with political
practice that will not result in debased, politicized pbilosophy instead
of the hoped-for pbilosophical praxis" (Sprintzen 245). And at the
very end of his essay he leaves the reader hangingwith the question
as to whether the end of Communism and Cold War politics
validates the spirit of Camus. On the other hand, Isaac concludes
that declaring Camus the winner would itself be contrary to the
spirit of Camus. Besides, "such judgments are really beside the
point" (Sprintzen 267). Rather than declaring winners and losers,
we on the fractured 'left' have our work cut out and do better to
learn from history's mistakes, which, in this case, includes the
warning not to let our ideological commitments blind us to what
we really value. In the end, anyone with a general interest in the
history of the left or a particular interest in Sartre and Camus would
do weil read both of these works.
Matthew Eshleman
Duquesne Universiry
Oona Ajzenstat (Eisenstadt), Driven Back to the Text:
The Premodern Sources oE Levinas's Postmodernism
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 388+ix
pages.
Oona Eisenstadt's book addresses programmatically, authoritatively,
and perceptively how Levinas's philosophical thought is informed
at almost every turn by Jewish practices of discourse. Among
readings of Levinas, such as those by Robert Gibbs and Richard
A. Cohen, that have relied upon Jewish sources, particularly from
the Rabbinie tradition, Eisenstadt's book is noteworthy for the
comprehensiveness and clarity with which she sets out the question
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of Levinas's Jewish underpinnings. As her tide suggests, Eisenstadt
foilows in the footsteps of Levinas himself, who, even as he moves
forward into a postmodern critique of enlightenment rationalism
and the cultures it has inspired, does so only as he turns back to
read and reread the texts of his own religious tradition. In marking
out this contrapuntal movement, the author first offers her account
of the basic themes at issue in Levinas and then takes up in
succeeding chapters how Levinas's reading of prophetic,
Kabbalistic, and Rabbinic texts conditions not only his engagement
with discrete philosophical questions but also the very sense of
what it means to question philosophicaily. A final chapter considers
how the Shoah or Holocaust provides a decisive scene, in which
the ethical, the most crucial philosophical category for Levinas,
finds its most exacting measure.
Eisenstadt rightly notes that the question of Levinas's
Judaism, and particularly that of its place in his philosophical
thought, has not been without controversy. Many readers of Levinas,
in their attentiveness to the universality of his philosophical themes,
would just as soon ignore the "particularity" of his religious
background. But Eisenstadt directs her reader to the complexity
of the term 'Judaism' as it is used by Levinas-of how it evokes
both a particular religious tradition and a "fundamental insight
into plurality, diversity, alterity, infinity ... in short ... a mode-
or at times the mode-of relation or ethics" (76). Further, Levinas
finds inJudaism a mode of thinking and speaking that is particularly
sensitive to the significance of the particular, or what Levinas would
call the singular, I'unique, in an account of the universal. The
sensitivity of the Judaic universal to the particular, to what
Eisenstadt terms the "universal each," as opposed to the "universal
alt' (244) ailows Judaism (at least for Levinas and Eisenstadt) to
play an exemplary role in his attempt to articulate an ethics that
would take seriously the singularity of the other to whom I am
responsible, as weil as the singularity of my responsibility to others.
Whether other traditions can function similarly remains an
open question. Certainly Levinas refers to non-Jewish writers such
as Shakespeare, Plato, or Dostoyevsky as expressing the ethical in
bis sense of the term. And bis long involvement with explicidy
Christian thinkers, even at times in the context of the Colloques des
intellectuelsjuifs de langue franfaise, suggests that 'Bible', in Levinas's
use of the term, means something more inclusive than simply the
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Tanach, the biblical text of his own religious tradition. In any event,
Eisenstadt's careful analysis of the manner in which Levinas draws
uponJewish sources in writing his philosophy reveals the blindness
at work in any approach to this thinker that would simply dismiss
his Judaism as being in toto irrelevant to his philosophy. The issue
of Levinas's Judaism, now fuHy out of the closet thanks to
Eisenstadt's careful exposition, deserves renewed consideration.
To "prevent speech" (1), which is to say, the speech of others,
has become an an too common practice in our age, in which we
find ourselves so confident of the clarity of our reasons, the
goodness of our intentions, and the greatness of our actions.
Eisenstadt's treatment of Levinas makes clear how this modern
confidence is undermined once we take seriously that the
significance of ethics, its proto-meaning, is announced in my
responsiveness to the other who approaches me. Because ethics
begins for Levinas in my inescapable obedience to being addressed
by the other, ethics from the very first involves me in discourse, in
the task of reading responsibly the expression, whether it be in
writing or speech or in a mute approach, of the other. Thus, the
manner in which Levinas himself reads others, whether they be
philosophers, religious authorities, victims of oppression, or even
victimizers, becomes exemplary in regard to his very thesis about
ethical responsibility. Further, these modes of reading are to be
contrasted, according to Eisenstadt, to "reductivist" practices of
discourse prevalent in our time, three of which she explicitly
identifies as troubling to Levinas: "Hegelianism, totalitarianism and
modern progressivist liberalism" (8).
At issue in the critique of these practices is the very meaning
of concreteness. For Levinas, Eisenstadt argues, the concrete is
not registered by means of specifying it as an event in a history or
a place in a hierarchy but rather by undergoing it as "a clash and a
breaking, a constant questioning, areversal in the psyche in which
what 'I' come into contact with is constantly being revealed as
devastatingly new and higher" (8). In opposition to the devastation
of the concrete elicited by Levinasian discourse, is the reification
or sacralization of the concrete instituted by discourses of totality,
which is to say, discourses ultimately viewing and ordering reality
through a "single unifying lens" (9). Such discourses inevitably
reduce all alterity, all the expressions of the other, to the same. The
persuasiveness of Levinas's "broken language" (98), for Eisenstadt,
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does not lie in its ordering of ail aspeets of experienee into some
magnifieent and subtle whole, but in its ceaselessly registering a
disruption of that whole.
And yet, Levinas understands the inevitability of totalities,
of arguments for systems, even as he undermines them. An
important point to be made here is how ail philosophical diseourse,
as weIl as its political, social, historieal, scientific, and religious
counterparts, ultimately engages in a "necessary betrayal" of the
ethical relation. For simply to express a truth is already in some
sense to involve oneself in the expression of an interlocking system
of arguments, and so in a totality. In Levinasian parlance, one's
saying oE the truth inevitably becomes a said. But Eisenstadt would
have her reader distinguish between this necessary, albeit provisional,
totality that Levinas would accept and the, in Eisenstadt's words,
"avoidable totality" (11) that would substitute a "seeond reality"
(8) constructed of words diseonnected from singular others for
the mueh more disconcerting and devastating reality of our contaet
in discourse with these others.
In turning to prophetie, Kabbalistie, and Rabbinie writings
as distinct categories, Eisenstadt helps Levinas's reader understand
that Judaism itself is articulated in a plurality of discourses, each
oE which in its own fashion resists the coilapse of concreteness
and the institution of the second reality characteristic of reductive
diseourses of totality. Although, like Gibbs and Cohen, Eisenstadt
foregrounds the Rabbinie tradition in her analysis, her attention to
prophetie and Kabbalistic writings is also invaluable. Her diseussion
is both informed and wide-ranging, and includes a consideration
of Levinas's background within the Mitnagdic tradition, as weil as
an outline to Lurianic and Abulafian approaches to the Kabbalah.
But most importantly, Eisenstadt ably shows how each tradition
suggests solutions to questions arising as Levinas works out the
full implications-both theological and philosophical-of his
reorientation of ethics. For instance, Eisenstadt traces out and
helpfuily expands upon how the prophetie announcement of G-d
in the Bible, as weH as the midrash addressing that announcement
in the Talmud, aHows Levinas to construet a hermeneutics focused
on human relations, with a tripartite structure of abusive, poetic or
prophetie, and then skeptical discourse (98ff.).
Eisenstadt argues that Levinas's formulation of this final
category, skeptical discourse, is guided by the hermeneutical
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praetices of the Rabbinie tradition, for whieh "no set of principles"
ean be given "by whieh all eases [of halakhah or Law] are measured
symmetrically or equaIly; instead we find the constant subordination
of the general rule to the particular case" (55). For Levinas, the
skepticism of Talmudic thought pointedly refuses sacralization or
reification by undoing closed dialeetical oppositions and so fostering
"dynamism, ... real rupture" (215). Levinas's turn to Talmudic
thought, Eisenstadt argues, is particularly direeted toward resisting
that Hegelian notion of history, in which events may be on the
move but are so only insofar as they contribute to a universal result,
the edifice of spirit as it is finaIly elaborated by and in history.
Theodicy, in which the suffering of others is justified through its
outcome in history, is, in Levinas's mind, the most unbearable of
thoughts. Eisenstadt's careful reading in her final chapter, "Night
Spaces," of how the suffering of the victims of the Shoah figures
within Levinas's philosophical exploration of the significance of
ethics provides, along with Robert Gibbs's W~ Ethics?, perhaps
the most nuanced and eareful working-out to date of what Rabbinie
diseourse might bring to the writing of philosophy.
James Hatlry
Salisbury University
Leonard Lawlor, Thinking through French Philosophy:
The Being oE the Question (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2003), xvi+212 pages.
In Thinking through French Philosop~.· The Being of theQuestionJ Leonard
Lawlor brings together the philosophies of three of the most
important thinkers of 1960s France, Michel Foucault, Jacques
Derrida, and GiIles Deleuze. The book relates these thinkers to
each other and to their predeeessors in the French and German
contexts (Merleau-Ponty, Hyppolite, Husserl, and Heidegger) in
ways that are not only novel but designed to open up new avenues
oE thinking. The book is composed oE an introduction, eight essays,
and a conclusion, as weIl as two appendiees. Seven of the eight
essays have appeared elsewhere and were revised for the volume,
rhile the introduction, first chapter, and conclusion were written
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